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SESSION 3: KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THE MOST MORAL OF RIGHTS:
THE RIGHT TO BE RECOGNIZED AS THE AUTHOR OF ONE’S WORK
Professor Jane. C. Ginsburg *
Abstract
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to secure for
limited times the exclusive right of authors to their writings.
Curiously, those rights, as enacted in our copyright laws, have not
included a general right to be recognized as the author of one's
writings. Yet, the interest in being identified with one's work is
fundamental, whatever the conception of the philosophical or
policy basis for copyright. The basic fairness of giving credit
where it is due advances both the author-regarding and the publicregarding aspects of copyright.
Most national copyright laws guarantee the right of
attribution (or “paternity”); the leading international copyright
treaty, the Berne Convention, requires that Member States protect
other Members' authors' right to claim authorship. But, apart
from an infinitesimal (and badly drafted) recognition of the right in
the 1990 Visual Artist’s Right Act, and an uncertain and indirect
route through protection of copyright management information,
the U.S. has not implemented that obligation. Perpetuating that
omission not only allows a source of international embarrassment
to continue to fester; it also belittles our own creators. Copyright
not only protects the economic interests in a work of authorship, it
also secures (or should secure) the dignitary interests that for
many authors precede monetary gain. Without established and
enforceable attribution rights, U.S. copyright neither meets
international norms nor fulfills the aspirations of the constitutional
Copyright Clause.
This article will analyze the bases and enforceability of
attribution rights within international norms. It will review the
*
Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. Many thanks for research assistance to Jake Grubman, Columbia
Law School class of 2016, to Pam Samuelson for helpful suggestions, to Shira Perlmutter for
analysis of free trade agreements, and to Andreas Gebhard, Yoko Miyashita, Jeff Sedlik, Lisa
Willmer, and Nancy Wolff for information regarding author-identification data in digital
images. (Any factual or analytical errors in that regard are mine alone.).
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sources of attribution rights in the current U.S. copyright law,
particularly the Visual Artists Rights Act, and § 1202’s coverage of
copyright management information. It will explore the extent to
which removal of author-identifying information might violate
§ 1202 and/or disqualify an online service provider from the § 512
safe harbors. Finally, it will consider how our law might be
interpreted or amended to provide for authorship attribution.
Non-legislative measures include making authorship attribution a
consideration under the first factor of the fair use defense.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The French revolutionary legislator, Le Chapelier, famously
declared, “Of all properties, the most sacred, the most legitimate, the least
contestable, and if I may say, the most personal, is the right the author has
in the fruits of his labor.” 1 Descending from those rhetorical (and foreign)
heights, I will affirm that the most moral and the most intuitive author's
right is the right to be recognized as the creator of her works. In fact, most
non-experts in copyright law—in other words, ordinary folk, and for that
matter, authors themselves, as evidenced by various remarks throughout this
Symposium—think that authors do enjoy the right to be credited for their
works. Of all the many counter-intuitive features of US copyright law—and
they abound—the lack of an attribution right may present the greatest gap
between perceived justice and reality.
Even entities whose relationship to copyright is ambivalent
acknowledge the basic fairness of giving credit. For example, Creative
Commons has long made attribution a default in its parallel copyright
universe. 2 The Copyright Principles Project, few if any of whose
participants could be impugned with authors’ rights maximalism,
recommended “that Congress give serious consideration to granting authors
a right of attribution.” 3 Another example of the fundamental nature of
authorship attribution: many who lack enthusiasm for paying authors, such
as many online platforms, query who needs money when free distribution
1
Jean Le Chapelier, Report to the Revolutionary Parliaments of Le Chapelier, LE
MONITEUR UNIVERSEL, Jan. 15, 1791, reprinted in 7 RÉIMPRESSION DE L'ANCIEN MONITEUR
113, 116-18 (1860).
2
CREATIVE COMMONS, About the Licenses, http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/
(last visited June 1, 2016).
3
See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1175, 1188 (2010) (“Because attribution has become a more
accepted social norm in the U.S. in recent years, we recommend that Congress give serious
consideration to granting authors a right of attribution.”).
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gives authors great exposure. Exposure, however, implies credit for the
work. Reputation may eventually lead to revenue, but not if those who
might pay the author do not know who she is. Whether one creates for
glory or for more material gain, being identified with one’s work buttresses
creativity.
The importance of attribution in stimulating and supporting
creativity underscores its centrality to the broader public interest. We all
benefit from the “sacrificial days devoted to . . . creative activities.” 5
Beyond attribution as an incentive to creativity, the public has an interest in
knowing who created a work of authorship so that readers, viewers,
listeners (etc.), can continue to enjoy past or future works by authors who
have earned their approbation. The absence of attribution rights doubly
deprives: an author cannot build a “following,” and her audience cannot
follow her work, without the essential information that ties a work to its
author, and to her public.
Last, but not least, we have assumed an international obligation
under the Berne Convention to credit at least foreign authors. 6 The United
States, I believe, is the only country, including among common law
countries, not to include attribution rights in its copyright law. Whether or
not there is any effective international sanction for non-implementation of
this particular Berne Convention obligation, it is not a good thing to be an
international scofflaw.
Before I address the positive law and future prospects for moral
rights in the United States, I’ll evoke some arguments against the provision
of enforceable attribution rights in U.S. law, and the reasons, one theoretical
and two practical, that underlie them. One might classify the theoretical
objection under the rubric of post-modernism: Attribution rights overvalue
authorship; they are a vestige of the romantic conception of authorship. 7 If
4
See Brendan James, Unpaid Huffington Post Bloggers Actually Do Want To Get Paid,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/unpaid-huffington-post-bloggersactually-do-want-get-paid-2313744.
5
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
6
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept.
9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971 and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Berne]. Berne
does not require that member States provide Berne-level protection to their own authors. See
id. art. 5(3); see also infra Section II.
7
For critiques of author-ownership in general, see, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is an
Author?, reprinted in MICHEL FOUCAULT: AESTHETICS, METHOD, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 212
(J.D. Faubion ed., 1998); WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 74
(Oxford Univ. Press 2009). On the overvaluation of authorship attribution, see, e.g.,
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, & Zachary Burns, What’s a Name
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we no longer subscribe to that view, we shouldn't believe in attribution
rights, either. This objection, however, is only as convincing as its premise.
If we consider that creativity is not fungible, but rather requires talent,
persistence, and individuality to which the resulting work of authorship
gives expression, the post-modernist critique holds no purchase.
The second argument I'll call the slippery slope argument. We
might be willing to go along with attribution rights, but we fear they will
lead us to integrity rights. We don't want integrity rights because they limit
other authors' creative reuse of prior works, or for that matter, the leeway
that producers enjoy to revise works. What is the path of the slippery
slope? It does not in fact lead from the right of attribution, but rather from
the right to prevent false attribution. Recall the Monty Python case 8 earlier
evoked by Peter Yu. 9 There, the British comedians successfully invoked
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act a right to prevent association of their
name with a broadcast that was so altered it no longer accurately
represented Monty Python’s work. 10 (Today, the Supreme Court’s Dastar
decision 11, discussed in more detail by Peter Yu, 12 might change that
result.) Analytically, the right to prevent false attribution is not actually a
moral right, even though many common law countries include it in their
moral rights provisions. 13 The right to prevent false attribution is the right
to prevent the association of your name with a work you didn't create, in
other words, to prevent passing off as yours a work that no longer
corresponds to the work you created. Moral rights, by contrast, concern the
association of your name with a work you did create. Nonetheless, if a
moral rights law were to include both the positive and the negative aspects
of the right, then one can see how attribution rights (or rights against false

Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1389 (2013).
8
See generally Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
9
Peter K. Yu, Remarks at the U.S. Copyright Office’s Symposium, Authors, Attribution,
and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in the United States: The U.S. Perspective (Apr. 18,
2016), 8 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 27, 32-33 (2016); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right
to Claim Authorship in US Trademarks and Copyright Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 274-275
(2004) (analyzing impact of Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. on attribution rights claims).
10
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25.
11
See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
12
Yu, supra note 9, at 33-34.
13
See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 4, §84 (UK) [hereinafter UK
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act]; see generally Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000
(Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter Australian Moral Rights Act].
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attribution) could open a back door to integrity rights. On the other hand,
limiting attribution rights to the affirmative right to claim authorship, or
restricting remedies for false attributions of authorship to clear labeling
would keep that back door closed.
The third argument against attribution rights is the most practical
of all. It contends that it's simply too difficult to implement an attribution
right in practice. Our caselaw has enough trouble, in the joint works
context, identifying who is an author; it is unrealistic to add authorship
recognition rights. The task would be even more daunting were the rights
to apply to employees for hire, who are not statutory authors, but who
nonetheless participate in creating works. The potential plethora of authors
would require us to decide which ones should be recognized. If all were
entitled to authorship credit, we might end up with tiny print or endless film
credits that no one will look at anyway, so even if attribution rights existed
they would not in fact advance authors’ recognition interests. 14 In
rejoinder, while U.S. judges’ attempts to identify the kind of creativity that
makes one an “author” are not consistently convincing, 15 the point is
overstated; difficulties in determining whether a contributor at the fringes of
a creative enterprise should be denominated an “author” or “co-author”
should not obscure attribution claims where authorship is apparent.
Moreover, where the creators are multiple, business practice may assist in
identifying those entitled to authorship credit. That the resulting credits
may not attract most readers’ or viewers’ attention does not warrant
forgoing them altogether: some credit is better than none, and the fact of
formal recognition of authorship may be what matters most.
Having noted and briefly responded to those objections, let’s begin
with the sources of attribution rights. These include international norms
and some provisions of current US copyright law, specifically, the Visual
Artists Rights Act and § 1202’s coverage of copyright management
information (CMI). I will explore the extent to which removal of authoridentifying information might violate § 1202 and/or disqualify an online
service provider from the § 512 safe harbors. Other panels will address
various private ordering solutions. Finally, I will consider how our law
might be amended to provide for a right of authorship attribution.
II.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS

14
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
789 (2007).
15
See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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Article 6bis of the Berne Convention provides, in relevant part:
“[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work . . .” 16 As one of the Berne Convention’s substantive minima, the
right of attribution applies to member states’ treatment of foreign authors;
because Berne specifies that “[p]rotection in the country of origin is
governed by domestic law,” 17 the U.S. has no international obligation to
protect the right of its own authors to claim authorship. As a practical
matter, however, Berne member states are not likely to confer on foreign
authors more substantive rights than they grant their own; Berne thus tends
to harmonize domestic law to the international norm. 18 Nonetheless,
technically, the U.S.’ failure to protect its own authors does not breach
international obligations; its failure to ensure that foreign authors enjoy
minimum Berne rights puts us in violation. 19 But, as to article 6bis, the
violation effectively goes unpunished, because the principal mechanism for
enforcing Berne obligations, trade sanctions authorized by World Trade
Organization dispute resolution panels, is not available for non-compliance
with article 6bis. 20
By contrast, there is another, indirect, source of attribution rights in
the Berne Convention whose non-respect, I contend, can give rise to WTO
enforcement. The quotation right set out in article 10(1) provides:
It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has
already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that
their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does
not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press
summaries. 21

16

Berne, supra note 6, art. 6bis(1).
Id. art. 5(3).
18
Id. art. 18(3).
19
Id. art. 5.
20
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, art 9(1), 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (noting that “[m]embers shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that
Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”) [hereinafter TRIPS].
21
Berne, supra note 6, at art. 10(1).
17
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Article 10(3) continues:
Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding
paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be made of the source,
and of the name of the author if it appears thereon. 22
Article 10(1) does not afford member states an option to allow for
quotation rights 23. It directs their allowance, subject to a variety of
conditions, including mandatory mention of the source and of the name of
the author, if it appears on the work. Article 10(1)’s other conditions (fair
practice; proportionality) resemble the second and third of the article 9(2)
three-step test, which permits Berne member states to devise exceptions and
limitations to the reproduction right (extended through TRIPS article 13 to
all exclusive rights). 24 Article 9(2), however, does not require that member
states make authorship attribution a condition on permissible incursions on
the reproduction right. Because it is the later-enacted 25 provision, does
article 9(2) effectively override 10(3)?
As a general matter of
interpretation, the specific controls the general, so to the extent articles 10
and 9(2) overlap, article 10 would control. Moreover nothing in the
drafting history of article 9(2) indicates an intention to replace the article 10
mandatory quotation right with permissible, but not obligatory, entitlements
to reproduce portions of protected works. In addition, the article 10(3)
attribution condition is fully compatible with the third step of the three-step
test, which allows member states to devise exceptions or limitations that
“do[] not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”:
being credited as the author of the copied work is a legitimate interest, and
failure to credit the author may well unreasonably prejudice that interest. 26
Whether authorship attribution is an implicit, or at least
compatible, condition on permissible exceptions to exclusive rights, or an
explicit predicate to the mandatory quotation right, there remains a
significant shortcoming in the construction of a Berne attribution obligation:
Berne does not define who is an author. Rather, apart from an implicit
expectation that the “author” will be a human being, and not a juridical
22

Id. art. 10(3).
Id. art. 10(1).
24
Compare id. art. 10(1), with id. art. 9(2).
25
Current art. 9(2) was promulgated as part of the 1967 Stockholm revision. WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM: VOLUME II, 1146 (1971). Art. 10 was first
incorporated in the 1948 Brussels Revision. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND
BEYOND app. at 24, 262 (2d. ed. 2006).
26
Berne, supra note 6, art. 9(2).
23
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27

person, that question seems to be left to member states, whose conferral of
authorship status, particularly on employee authors, may differ. Moreover,
Berne does not dictate how employee authors are to be credited, if at all, in
the work’s country of origin. As a result, it is up to the country of origin to
determine whether an employee author’s name must appear on the work.
Appearance of the author’s name upon initial publication is a predicate to
application of Berne article 10 obligation to identify the source author when
authors in other countries quote from the work. In effect, if authorship
status is denied in the work’s country of origin, Berne does not bar other
member States from depriving employee authors of authorship status when
third parties quote their works.
On the other hand, if an employee author’s name does appear on
initial publication, Berne’s failure to define who is an author will probably
not lead to omission of the employee author’s name in the country where
the quotation right is exercised. The initial appearance of the author’s name
will result either from a law in the country of origin that requires authorship
credit regardless of employment status, or in countries of origin that do not
impose such a requirement, from a decision of the publisher, perhaps under
a collective bargaining agreement, to name the employee author
nonetheless. The beneficiary of the quotation right in another country under
whose law employees are not authors is unlikely to go to the trouble of
ascertaining if the named author was an employee in the work’s country of
origin, in order to deprive that creator of authorship recognition in the
country where the quotation right is exercised.
Because, as we have seen, article 10 does not ensure an affirmative
attribution right with respect to employee authors (or, for that matter,
authors in general) in the work’s country of origin, nor, consequently, in the
country of quotation, it operates very differently from the moral rights set
out in article 6bis. The distinction between an attribution condition on the
application of a copyright exception on the one hand, and the affirmative
article 6bis right on the other, however, may work to the benefit of authors
seeking international enforceability of their attribution interests. This is
because the TRIPS provision that excludes moral rights claims from dispute
resolution proceedings concerns “the rights conferred under Article 6bis of
[the Berne] Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.” 28 If the article
10(3) attribution condition is not a “right derived from” article 6bis, then a
member state’s failure to condition the quotation right on authorship
27
See, e.g. Sam Ricketson, People or Machines? The Berne Convention and the
Changing Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 11 (1993).
28
TRIPS, supra note 20, at art. 9.

52

GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L.

[VOL. 8:1

attribution (when the author’s name appears on the source work) could
subject that state to a dispute resolution procedure for non compliance with
enforceable provisions of the Berne Convention.
In addition, the drafting history of article 10(3) indicates that the
attribution condition on the quotation right was not considered an incident
of the article 6bis moral right of attribution. First, while article 6bis was
enacted as part of the 1928 Rome revision, article 10(3) came in with the
1948 Brussels revision. If the attribution condition was simply an
application of the 6bis obligation from which it arguably derived, then
article 10(3) would have been superfluous. But in 1948 it was:
not clear that the article 6bis moral rights otherwise applied to
lawful quotations, and the conference records indicate considerable
disinclination to recognize the integrity right in the context,
notably, of edited versions of text for use in schools. If lawful
quotations otherwise fell outside the control of article 6bis, the
delegates nonetheless agreed that the author’s name should be
recognized. Article 6bis having been sidelined, they therefore
established an independent basis for the attribution right. If
“derived from” implies “dependent on”, then this history suggests
that the distinct basis for articles 10 and 10bis rights of attribution
justifies their preservation in the Berne Convention articles that the
TRIPs Agreement makes enforceable. 29
Under this reasoning, then, the article 10(3) attribution condition is
a requirement distinct from the article 6bis attribution right, and the absence
of such a condition on the application of the fair use doctrine or any other
exception tantamount to a quotation right with respect to non U.S. Berne or
TRIPS works, places the U.S. in violation of an international copyright
norm enforceable under the TRIPS Accord.
III. DOMESTIC U.S. LAW
As mentioned earlier, the United States is an outlier not only with
respect to the civil law countries whose moral rights regimes arguably
reflect a more author-centric copyright regime in general, but also with
respect to common law countries. Common law countries other than the
U.S. have an attribution obligation in general, and specifically in connection
with copyright exceptions such as fair dealing. Fair dealing is narrower
29
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 25, ¶ 10.46; see also id. ¶ 13.110 (“No reference
is made to ‘moral rights’ in article 10(3) (by contrast with article 11bis(2); see below), and this
appears to stand as a separate requirement, quite apart from article 6bis.”).
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than fair use but it bears some similarity, and our common law counterparts
make authorship attribution a condition of the exception. 30 The European
Union has not harmonized moral rights, but in the Orphan Works directive,
article 6(3) makes the inclusion of the name of an identified author a
requirement under the EU Orphan Works regime. 31
U.S. copyright law contains three partial sources of attribution
rights. The first is the requirement in § 409 that the application for
copyright registration name the author. 32 The provision does not specify
whether “author” means statutory author, or any creator. 33 If the former,
then employee authors have no entitlement to be named in the application.
Moreover, § 409 applies only to the registration process; it does not require
that publicly-distributed or publicly exhibited copies bear the author’s
name. 34 The second is the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), whose scope
is extremely limited. The third is the § 1202 protection of copyright
management information against knowing removal or alteration. Although
its knowledge threshold is very high, this provision could afford a source of
attribution rights, especially to authors who embed author-identifying
information in digital copies of their works.
30
See Copyright Act of 1968 ss 41, 42, 44, 45, 103A, 103B (listing exceptions subject to
sufficient acknowledgement requirement); see id. at s 10 (defining “sufficient
acknowledgement”)(Austl.); see Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) ss
51-54, 57, 90 (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/28/enacted/en/html (listing
exceptions subject to sufficient acknowledgement requirement); see id. at s 51(3) (defining
“sufficient acknowledgement”); see Copyright Act 1994, ss 42, 46, 70 (N.Z.); (listing
exceptions subject to sufficient acknowledgement requirement); see id. at s 2 (defining
,“sufficient acknowledgement”); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, §§ 29-32, 36, 59
(listing exceptions subject to sufficient acknowledgement requirement); see id. at § 178
(defining “sufficient acknowledgement”) (UK); see Express Newspapers PLC v. News (UK)
LTD (1990) W.L.R 1320, 1327 (finding that a reproduction of a newspaper interview was not
justified as "fair dealing" because acknowledgment, referring to the newspaper as its source,
was not sufficient in that it failed to acknowledge the author); see Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c C-42 ss 29-30 (listing exceptions subject to authorship acknowledgement requirement) (Can.)
[hereinafter Canada Copyright Act].
“Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe copyright if
the following are mentioned: (a) the source; and (b) if given in the source, the name
of the (i) author, in the case of a work, (ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s
performance, (iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or (iv) broadcaster, in the
case of a communication signal.”
See id. at s 29.1.
31
Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works, art. 6(3), (L.299/5) (EC) (“Member States
shall ensure that the organisations referred to in Article 1(1) indicate the name of identified
authors and other rightholders in any use of an orphan work.”).
32
17 U.S.C. § 409(2).
33
Id.
34
Id. § 409.

54

GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L.

[VOL. 8:1

A. VARA
The extremely narrow scope of the 1990 Visual Artists Rights Act
renders it of very little assistance to authors in general, and even to visual
artists. One problem is the stinting definition of a “work of visual art,”
limited to physical originals and up to 200 signed and consecutively
numbered copies of a painting, drawing, print or sculpture. 35 VARA
confines protectable photographs to up to 200 signed and consecutively
numbered copies of “a still photographic image produced for exhibition
purposes only,” a category that does not in fact exist and that gives rise to
many practical difficulties. 36 For example, an image created for purposes of
publication in a fashion magazine would not qualify; if the photographer
subsequently produced a limited edition printing of those images for
purposes of exhibition (and sale), it appears that VARA would spurn that
printing because the image (rather than the particular printed impression)
was originally produced for purposes other than exhibition. Worse, suppose
the image was originally produced for exhibition purposes only, but
subsequently the photographer authorized the production of mass multiples.
The subsequent copies in excess of 200 (or any copy not signed and
consecutively numbered up to 200), not only fall outside VARA, but also
might retroactively disqualify the original limited printing because the
image (as opposed to the copy) will no longer have been “produced for
exhibition purposes only.”
The scope of attribution rights in works that do qualify as “works
of visual art” mirrors the miserly coverage of the definition. The acts that
infringe the attribution right turn on the definition of work of visual art,
which may make sense with respect to the integrity right (whose scope
Congress closely cabined), but treating attribution rights in parity with
integrity rights fails to think through whether the free speech concerns
underlying objections to integrity rights also apply to attribution rights.
Consider the following examples of the outcomes of pairing attribution and
integrity rights.
VARA enables a visual artist not only to seek attribution for works
of visual art that she did create, but also to prevent attribution of her name
to works of visual art that she did not create. 37 There is no VARA claim for
attribution or misattribution of the artist’s name to a work that does not
qualify as a “work of visual art.” 38 Thus, for example, the artist has no right
35

Id. § 101.
Id.
37
Id. § 106(a)(1).
38
Id. § 106(a).
36
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to authorship attribution, or against authorship misattribution, with respect
to mass-market multiples. If the artist’s name falsely appears on a work
that does meet the definition of a “work of visual art,” for example, on a
limited series of signed and numbered prints, the artist still will have no
claim unless the works she created also are “works of visual art.” Thus, if
none of a photographer’s works were “produced for exhibition purposes
only,” then misattributing even photographic prints that meet the VARA
definition to that photographer does not violate the VARA attribution right.
It would appear that, to enjoy VARA rights against misattribution, a
photographer or other artist would have at least once to have created works
that meet the VARA definition.
Even if an artist has at some point produced a “work of visual art”
and therefore would have standing to advance a VARA misattribution
claim, that claim pertains only to misattributions in connection with other
works of visual art. 39 If our hypothetical print maker produces a run of 201
signed and numbered prints, none of the prints will be “works of visual art”
and VARA will provide no remedy for the misattribution. This result might
not be too troublesome, were there other legal provisions that might afford a
remedy. But the Supreme Court’s Dastar decision suggests that VARA
may afford the only source of attribution rights, and that any Lanham Act
protection would be impermissibly superfluous. 40 Moreover, lower courts
have accorded Dastar a preemptive effect that precludes not only Lanham
Act-related attribution claims, but also claims under state laws. 41
Conferring such broad preemptive reach to VARA claims applies Dastar
far too zealously: compared to the universe of Lanham Act and state claims,
a VARA attribution action looks like a pea alongside a watermelon.
Nonetheless this Dastar-derived interpretation would award precedence to
the pea.
B. Copyright Management Information
1.

International norms

Section 1202, protecting copyright management information,
implements an international obligation under article 12 of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WCT). The
international text provides:
39

Id.
See Dastar, Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003).
41
See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Moral Rights in the US: Still in Need of a Guardian
Ad Litem, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 81-85 (2012) (reviewing cases).
40
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(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal
remedies against any person knowingly performing any of the
following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having
reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or
conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty or the
Berne Convention:
(i) to remove or alter any electronic rights management
information without authority;
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or
communicate to the public, without authority, works or copies of
works knowing that electronic rights management information has
been removed or altered without authority.
(2) As used in this Article, “rights management information”
means information which identifies the work, the author of the
work, the owner of any right in the work, or information about the
terms and conditions of use of the work, and any numbers or codes
that represent such information, when any of these items of
information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in
connection with the communication of a work to the public. 42
The violation consists in the knowing removal or alteration of
copyright management information having reasonable grounds to know that
the removal or alteration will facilitate “any right covered by this Treaty or
Authorship attribution rights are Berne
the Berne Convention.” 43
Convention rights under article 6bis and indirectly under article 10(3). 44 As
a result, under the international norm, author-identifying information is
protected rights management information, and its knowing removal would
violate a right covered by the Berne Convention. Because Berne specifies
the independence of moral and economic rights, the removal of the authoridentifying information by the holder of the economic rights could violate
and facilitate the violation of the author’s 6bis rights. 45 The U.S.
implementation of WCT article 12 departs from the international text in one
important way. Section 1202 states:

42
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 12, Apr. 12, 1997, 2186
U.N.T.S. 121 (emphasis added).
43
Id. art. 12(1) (emphasis added).
44
Berne, supra note 6, art. 10(3).
45
At least when the author has not transferred moral rights (and to the extent that the
country where the work is exploited permits transfers of moral rights).
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(a) False Copyright Management Information. — No person shall
knowingly and with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or
conceal infringement —
(1) provide copyright management information that is false, or
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management
information that is false.
(b) Removal or Alteration of Copyright Management Information.
— No person shall, without the authority of the copyright owner or
the law —
(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright management
information,
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management
information knowing that the copyright management information
has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright
owner or the law, or
(3) distribute, import for distribution, or publicly perform
works, copies of works, or phonorecords, knowing that copyright
management information has been removed or altered without
authority of the copyright owner or the law,
knowing, or, with respect to civil remedies under section 1203,
having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable,
facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any right under this title. 46
Apart from the extremely limited coverage of VARA, authorship
attribution is not a “right under this title.” Removal of authorship
information does not violate § 1202 unless it facilitates infringement of an
economic right. If the creator no longer owns, or never did own, exclusive
economic rights under copyright, the creator would have no claim. While
an authorized exploiter who deleted authorship-identifying information
would violate article 12 of the WCT, that text is not self-enforcing in the
U.S. The possibility that authorized exploiters would remove or alter
author-identifying information is not negligible, but an authorized exploiter
is not a copyright infringer, so, unless the author can demonstrate that the
absence or alteration of author-identifying information would facilitate
infringement by unauthorized downstream users, she would have no §1202
claim.

46

17 U.S.C. § 1202 (emphasis added).
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The WCT postdates TRIPS; accordingly violations of the later
agreement do not give rise to a WTO dispute resolution procedure. But the
US’s incomplete implementation of WCT article 12 might nonetheless
expose the U.S. to international sanctions. Free Trade Agreements that the
U.S. has concluded, for example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
oblige signatories to “ratify or accede to” the WIPO Copyright Treaties. 47
The TPP includes an article on rights management information (RMI),
defining a violation as the knowing alteration or removal of RMI “without
authority, and knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know, that it
would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of the copyright
or related right of authors, performers or producers of phonograms.” 48
Arguably, “copyright” encompasses only the economic rights, though the
explicit incorporation of moral rights in most common law jurisdictions
belies this claim; moreover, the French and Spanish language versions of
the TPP refer to author’s rights (“droit d’auteur”; “derecho de autor”),
which certainly cover both moral and economic rights. 49 Alternatively,
perhaps the provision refers to the scope of copyright provided by national
law, and therefore would not reach removals or alterations of RMI that
induced, enabled, facilitated or concealed a violation of attribution rights if
national law excluded attribution rights from the scope of copyright.
But the TPP also requires ratification of the Berne Convention, 50
and the TPP’s provisions on dispute resolution, 51 unlike those of the TRIPS,
do not exclude Berne article 6bis. The TPP’s direction to ratify Berne and
other multilateral accords implies a requirement not only to undertake
measures for the treaties’ entry into force in the ratifying or acceding States,
but also in fact to implement those instruments’ obligations in good faith. 52
On the other hand, the TPP also states: “[e]ach party shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
47
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 18.7(2)(e), signed February 4, 2016 by all
parties (not yet in force) https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacificpartnership/tpp-full-text (last visited June 25, 2016) [hereinafter TPP].
48
Id. art. 18.69(1)(a) (emphasis added).
49
See, e.g., France, CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE) art. L111-1 (Fr.). The author’s property right “includes intellectual and moral as well as
economic attributes.” Id.
50
TPP, supra note 47, at art. 18.7(1)(c).
51
Id. art. 28. As with WTO dispute resolution, proceedings are between member states.
TPP art. 28.21 precludes private rights of action. Id. art. 28.21.
52
See, e.g, ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 160-62 (3d ed. 2013)
(discussing art. 26, Vienna Conv. on the Law of Treaties: “Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties and must be performed in good faith”; the U.S. is not a party to the Vienna
Conv., but art. 26 expresses the general public international law principle of pacta sunt
servanda).
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53

chapter within its own legal system and practice.” This provision leaves it
up to treaty parties to choose how to implement their obligations under the
Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaties. Thus, it may preclude
other treaty parties from initiating a dispute resolution proceeding alleging
that the U.S. has “failed to carry out an obligation under this Agreement.” 54
That said, how to implement is not the same as whether to
implement; “appropriate method of implementing” nonetheless implies
implementation in fact. This text does not give treaty parties a choice of
implementing some obligations but not others. The U.S. may in general
implement its Berne and WIPO Treaty obligations by means of copyright
law, or through other statutory or judge-made doctrines and remedies, 55 but
one way or another, it must provide the substantive equivalent of the
protections those instruments require. U.S. law, particularly after Dastar,
simply does not afford a substantive equivalent to the Berne Convention’s
affirmative attribution rights. At best, VARA grants a very incomplete
attribution right; post-Dastar, trademark law may still allow an action
against passing off, but there is no general right to be recognized as a
creator of the work that an author may enforce against non-parties to a
contract.
The principal objection to this analysis is pragmatic: the U.S. is
very unlikely to have agreed to a text that would subject it to possible
liability for non-implementation of Berne article 6bis, whether directly or
through WCT article 12.
From that realpolitik perspective, the
“infringement of copyright” referred to in TPP article 18.69(1)(a) can only
mean rights under copyright as defined in each member State’s national
law, independently of international norms, unless the treaty explicitly makes
those norms enforceable. For example, TRIPS, article 9(1) states:
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members
shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect
53

TPP, supra note 47, at art. 18.5.
Id. art. 28.3 provides in relevant part:
1. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, the dispute settlement
provisions of this Chapter shall apply: . . .
(b) when a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of another
Party is or would be inconsistent with an obligation of this Agreement or
that another Party has otherwise failed to carry out an obligation under this
Agreement; . . .
55
In the case of RMI protection, however, the wording of TPP art. 18:69(1)(a), tying a
violation to “infringement of copyright,” would mean that as to this international obligation,
the U.S. does not have a choice of implementing the obligation through some other legal
regime.
54
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of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that Convention or of
the rights derived therefrom. 56
The language excluding Berne article 6bis indicates, a contrario,
that Members shall have rights or obligations under TRIPS in respect of
Berne rights set out in articles 1-21 other than 6bis. Moreover, the TRIPS’s
“shall comply” more specifically mandates implementation than does the
TPP’s article 18:55 delegation to treaty parties to determine methods of
implementation of international obligations. If the TPP does not command
or imply full implementation of every Berne-WIPO Treaties obligation,
then there would be no legal basis for an action against the U.S. for
insufficient implementation of WCT article 12 (or, for that matter, of Berne
article 6bis).
Setting aside the tantalizing but perhaps overoptimistic possibility
that, with respect to non-domestic works, the TPP obliges member States to
prohibit removal or alteration of author-identifying CMI (independently of
the relationship of those acts to the infringement of economic rights), and
returning to U.S. law, under what circumstances might removal or alteration
of authorship-identifying information violate § 1202 of the U.S. Copyright
Act? The author will need to demonstrate that the person who removed or
altered the author’s name both did so knowingly and should have known
that the removal or alteration would conceal or facilitate infringement (of an
exclusive economic right). The double knowledge standard, as we will see,
presents a significant hurdle. But first, two threshold issues: what is
“copyright management information”?; where must copyright management
information appear in order to be protected under the statute?
2.

What is CMI; How is its protection violated?

Regarding the first question, U.S. courts initially divided over
whether only identifying information that is part of an “automated copyright
protection or management system” can be deemed CMI protected under §
1202. While the WCT requires protection only of “electronic rights
management information,” the text of § 1202 is broader, since it specifies
“including in digital form” 57: the text necessarily covers non-digital form as
well. Some courts nonetheless justified their reading of “including” to
mean “only if” (and in addition, only if the digital information is part of a
rights management system) on the ground that § 1202 was enacted as part
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; that the title of the chapter to
56
57

TRIPS, supra note 20, at art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
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which § 1201 and § 1202 belong is “Copyright Protection and Management
Systems;” and that Congress’ goal in § 1202 was to foster electronic
commerce. 58 As the Third Circuit recognized, however, that § 1202
emerged from a context of legislative responses to the challenges of digital
communications neither precludes a more general role for CMI, nor
compels such a substantial rewriting of the definition. 59 Thus, the statutory
text does not justify this judge-made limitation on the application of § 1202
to authors’ attribution interests. Subsequent decisions have followed the
Third Circuit’s plain reading. 60
In providing: “[a]s used in this section, the term ‘copyright
management information’ means any of the following information
conveyed in connection with [the work],” the statutory definition does not
specify who affixes or incorporates CMI. 61 An obvious candidate is the
copyright owner (who may also be the author), since the sixth element of
information listed in the definition, “[t]erms and conditions for use of the
work,” 62 would pertain most directly to the copyright owner. But the
supplier of the CMI could also be an intermediary agent or licensing entity,
such as a stock photo house. 63
The statutory definition details the protected information. It
includes “the name of, and other identifying information about, the author
of the work.” 64 “Author” here could mean any creator, or it might be
limited to statutory authors, thus excluding employees for hire. But
subsection 8 of the statutory definition allows the Copyright Office to
“prescribe by regulation” “other information,” so the Copyright Office
could designate the names of employee and commissioned creators as
protectable CMI. The statute, however, does not require that works
58
See, e.g., Textile Secrets Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d. 1184, 119899 (C.D. Cal. 2007); IQ Group v. Wiesner Pub., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D.N.J. 2006).
59
See Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp., LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting
that § 1202’s legislative history does not provide “the extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions” that would compel disregarding the plain meaning of the statute).
60
See, e.g., Williams v. Cavalli, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34722, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
12, 2015) (murals); Roof & Rack Prods. v. GYB Inv’r’s, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92333,
at *14 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2014) (structural drawings); Leveyfilm, Inc. v. Fox Sports Interactive
Media, LLC, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (analog music albums); Logan
Developers, Inc. v. Heritage Bldg.’s, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140909, at *25–26
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (house designs).
61
17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
62
Id. § 1202(c)(6).
63
See, e.g., GETTY IMAGES, License Agreements,
http://www.gettyimages.com/Corporate/LicenseAgreements.aspx (last visited June 18,
2016).
64
17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(2).
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incorporate CMI, nor, if the work includes CMI, does the statute compel the
inclusion of all elements of information listed in the definition of CMI. 65
Where the author’s name does appear, a broad reading of CMI to
include author-identifying information on analog as well as digital copies,
whether or not in connection with a rights management “system,” could
mean that removal or alteration of a copyright notice bearing the author’s
name, or of an author’s byline, even from analog copies, establishes one of
the elements of a § 1202 violation. Removal or alteration standing alone,
however, does not suffice. It is also necessary to consider what “conveyed
in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or
displays of a work” means, and, most importantly, whether the complaining
author 66 can surpass the statute’s high threshold for proving the requisite
intent.
Regarding the location of CMI, in the case of analog copies of
works containing other authors’ works (principally books incorporating
photographs or illustrations), courts have divided over whether a general
copyright notice is sufficiently “conveyed in connection with” the work, or
whether the author’s name must appear in closer proximity to her
contribution. 67 In the digital context, some courts have interpreted “in
connection with” to require that the identifying information be embedded in

65
See id. at § 1202(c) (defining “copyright management information” using the phrase
“any of the following information,” as opposed to “all of the following information,”
suggesting that the copyright owner is free to choose which among the elements of information
listed in the definition it wishes to incorporate).
66
§ 1203 grants standing to “any person injured by a violation of section . . . 1202 …”
See id. at § 1203(a); id. at § 501(b). If the author is “the legal or beneficial owner of an
exclusive right under a copyright” pursuant to § 501(b), she should cross the § 1203 “person
injured” threshold. If she has no economic interest in the work, she would contend that the
statute’s inclusion of author-identifying information within the definition of CMI confers an
interest that would make the author a “person injured” under § 1203. She might also urge that
the injury to her reputation and economic prospects from removal or alteration of authorship
attribution makes her a “person injured.”
67
Compare Watson v. Kappa Map Grp., LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82941, at *4-5
(N.D. Ga. June 25, 2015) (ruling that CMI from the inside cover of a map was not “conveyed
in connection with” the cover image and therefore could not form the basis for a § 1202(a)
claim), and Drauglis v. Kappa Map Grp., LLC, 128 F. Supp. 3d 49, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2015)
(same), with Tomelleri v. Zazzle, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165007, at *41 (D. Kan. Dec. 9,
2015) (concluding that the author’s name on the cover applied to all the illustrations in the
book), and Leveyfilm, Inc. v. Fox Sports Interactive Media, LLC, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 110203 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (concluding that the author’s name on the back cover of an album was clear
enough to apply to the photo on the cover). Arguably, the third element of § 1202’s definition
of copyright management information, “[t]he name of, and other identifying information about,
the copyright owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of copyright,”
implies that a copyright notice suffices as CMI. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(3).
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68

the copy or phonorecord of the work, while others have rejected such a
The language of the statute does not command
narrow view. 69
incorporation of the CMI in the copy of the work: “conveyed in connection
with” does not mean “on copies,” and if a “performance of a work” is
involved, embedding may not be possible. 70
Finally, the statutory double intent standard may prove a
significant impediment to many CMI claims against alteration or removal of
authorship attribution. Under § 1202(a), provision of false CMI does not
violate the statute unless done with the intent to aid infringement. 71 Under
§ 1202(b), the wrongful act is not simply removing or altering the
attribution or distributing or publicly performing or displaying the work
without the attribution. The statute also requires that those who distribute,
perform or display the work: (1) have known that the attribution was
removed or altered without the copyright owner’s authorization, and (2) that
those who remove or alter the attribution, or who distribute or perform
works whose attribution has been removed or altered, do so “knowing, or . .
. having reasonable grounds to know that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or
conceal an infringement of any right under this title.” 72 Thus, even
intentional removal or alteration of authorship attribution is not unlawful if
the plaintiff cannot show that the person who removed or altered the
information, or who performed or distributed the changed work, should
have known that the removal or alteration would encourage or facilitate
copyright infringement. 73

68
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 336
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that information was on photographer’s webpage, not on
individual photographs); Schiffer Pub., Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23052 at *46 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004) (holding that § 1202 applies only when CMI is removed
“from the "body" of, or area around, plaintiff's work itself.”).
69
See Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing
BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 610-11 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010));
BanxCorp, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 610-11.
70
The statute contains elaborate provisions regarding CMI and analog and digital
transmissions by broadcast and cable systems. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(e).
71
Courts have held that simply placing a work on a website without authorization does
not convey false CMI because mere posting does not imply assertion of copyright ownership of
the posted content. See Tomelleri, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165007 at *36-37; Pers. Keepsakes,
Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 920, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The
Tomelleri court declined to rule whether the website’s false statement that it had licensed the
image constituted false CMI because in any event plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the
false statement was made with the intent to aid infringement. See 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165007 at *37.
72
17 U.S.C. § 1202(b).
73
See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns and Mullen Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th
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The cases suggest that the second level of intent is most likely to
be established when the defendant, having removed or altered the CMI,
distributes the work without the accompanying information (or with altered
information) to third parties, who will in turn make the work available to
the public. Thus, in McClatchey v. Associated Press, 74 in rejecting the AP’s
motion for summary judgment, the court held:
Under Plaintiff’s version of the facts, AP intentionally cropped the
copyright notice out of the picture before distributing it to
subscribers. This appears to be precisely the conduct to which
Section 1202(b) is directed. As Plaintiff notes, the nature of APs’
business is to provide stories and pictures for use by its members
and subscribers. Thus, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
by cropping out the copyright notice, Defendant had the requisite
intent to induce, enable, facilitate or conceal infringement. 75
While McClatchey concerned removal of a copyright notice, the
decision is relevant to authorship attribution claims because copyright
notices often bear the author’s name. In addition, even where the work did
not include a copyright notice, intentional removal of the author’s name and
redistribution of the work can facilitate infringement, at least where the
work circulates without other information that indicates to subsequent
distributors from whom to seek permission to exploit the work. 76

Cir. 2003); Kelly, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Schiffer, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23052, at
*45-46.
74
McClatchey v. Associated Press, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768, at *1 (W.D. Pa. March
9, 2007).
75
Id. at *16-17; accord Gardner v. CafePress, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173726, at
*10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014); Agence France Presse v. Morel, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112436, at * 23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2014). Cf. Meredith v. Chi. Tribune Co., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2346, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2014) (dismissing § 1202(b) claim even if the party
reasonably knows that distribution might lead to infringing conduct, plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the distributor also had knowledge that CMI had been improperly removed).
76
In Agence France Presse v. Morel, AFP initially posted plaintiff’s photographs of the
2010 earthquake in Haiti attributed to another author. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112436, at * 3-4.
AFP subsequently corrected the attribution, but continued to distribute the photographs without
Morel’s authorization. Id. at * 4. The court held that:
the jury could have concluded that in continuing to distribute the photographs with
a caption identifying Morel as the photographer, AFP had both altered the ‘name of
. . . the author’ of the photographs, 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(2), without the authority of
the copyright owner, and had distributed Morel's images while knowing that their
CMI had been altered without his authority. And the jury could have concluded that
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By contrast, where the person removing the authorship attribution
has directly distributed the work to the public, in order to demonstrate that
the removal or alteration will facilitate copyright infringement, it may be
necessary to show that the defendant knew or should have known that endconsumer recipients would be induced by the absence or alteration of the
author’s name to infringe the work. Evidence that the distributor expected
end-users in turn to redistribute, for example through file-sharing or posting
to social media, could meet the statutory standard.
3.

CMI protection and metadata-stripping by social media platforms

The role of social media platforms not only as hosts of CMIremoved copies, but also in themselves removing authorship-identifying
information (and CMI more generally) and making available data-stripped
versions of works of authorship, especially photographs, deserves particular
consideration. For digital photographs, CMI metadata embedded in the
files identifies, among other things, ownership, copyright, and contact
information, and information about the contents of the photo. Some
metadata is embedded automatically upon the creation of a digital photo,
and metadata can also be added in the post-production process, for example,
when a photographer uploads to an image site, such as Getty Images. 77
There are a variety of metadata standards governed by various
organizations, including: International Press Telecommunications Council
(IPTC) Information Interchange Model (IIM); Extensible Metadata
Platform (XMP, standards created by Adobe); and Exchangeable Image File
Format (EXIF). 78 The International Press Telecommunications Council has
conducted studies over the last four years assessing the extent to which

AFP knew or had reasonable grounds to know that its alteration of CMI would
‘induce, enable, or facilitate infringement’ by enabling the continued licensing of
Morel's images—which were now credited to Morel but still not AFP's to license—
to AFP's customers. Id. at * 23.
77
See, e.g., id. at *24 (referring to Getty’s addition of image identifiers).
78
See generally INTERNATIONAL PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, IPTC Photo
Metadata Standard, http://www.iptc.org/standards/photo-metadata/iptc-standard/ (last visited
June 4, 2016); INTERNATIONAL PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, Information
Interchange Model (IIM), https://iptc.org/standards/iim/ (last visited June 4, 2016); ADOBE,
Extensible Metadata Platform (XMP), http://www.adobe.com/products/xmp.html (last visited
June 4, 2016); AV& IT STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE, EXCHANGEABLE IMAGE FILE
FORMAT
FOR
DIGITAL
STILL
CAMERAS:
EXIF
VERSION
2.3,
(2002)
http://www.jeita.or.jp/japanese/standard/book/CP-3451C_E/#page=1 (last visited June 4,
2016).
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various websites remove or modify photo files’ metadata. The studies
focused specifically on various sites’ treatment of IPTC/IIM and EXIF
information. 79 IPTC/IIM metadata can include a wide range of information
about the photo’s creation, including: creator, creator’s job title, contact
information (address, phone number, email address, and website), date
created, credit line, instructions, source, copyright notice, and rights usage
terms (among others). 80
The IPTC study assessed various websites by uploading a photo
with metadata and then ascertaining: (1) whether the embedded metadata
fields were shown by the web user interface, (2) if so, whether the data
displayed included the most relevant metadata fields (the “4 C’s”: caption,
creator, copyright notice, and credit line); (3) whether an image saved
(through “Save Image As…” included EXIF information in the EXIF
header and IPTC information in the IIM and XMP headers; and (4) whether
a downloaded image through the website’s user interface (such as a
download button) included the same information. The websites tested
included Facebook, Instagram, Flickr, Tumblr, Twitter, Pinterest, LinkedIn,
Google Photo, Behance.net and others. Of the sites tested, only Behance.net
included and displayed all of the rights-relevant fields and preserved that
information for saved or downloaded images. Several sites did not display
metadata at all, and none but Behance displayed the “4 C’s.” The “Save As
Embedded” and “Download Embedded” results seem to indicate the extent
to which metadata is stripped from the file, as opposed to merely hidden
from view. The results vary, even for images saved and downloaded from
the same site. Google Photo, for example, preserves metadata information
when the photo is downloaded using the Google interface but does not
preserve IPTC information when the photo is saved using “Save Image
As….” 81
79
Most digital photos created by smartphones incorporate EXIF, and categories of
information cover technical details regarding the camera and image taken, including: camera,
date taken, GPS location, create date, modified date, date/time original, image unique ID,
exposure time, ISO, aperture value, brightness value, shutter speed value, light source, scene
capture type, flash, and white balance. See Mark Milian, Digital Photos Can Reveal Your
Location,
Raise
Privacy
Fears,
CNN
(Oct.
15,
2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/10/15/photo.gps.privacy/.
80
The IPTC lists more information on its Core Metadata schema. See generally
INTERNATIONAL PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, IPTC Standard: Photo Metadata,
12
(2010),
https://www.iptc.org/std/photometadata/specification/IPTC-PhotoMetadata201007.pdf.
81
The IPTC study website summarizes the results of the test for each website, with the
results listed under the table header “Summary.” See IPTC, Social Media Sites Photo Metadata
Test Results, http://www.embeddedmetadata.org/social-media-test-results.php (last visited June
26, 2016); see also IPTC, Many Social Media Sites Still Remove Image Rights Information
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If the social media platforms are themselves stripping metadata
when users post the images, or if the programs they make available to other
users to download the images remove the data, would the platforms be
violating § 1202? Assuming the metadata qualifies as CMI, do the
platforms’ acts (1) intentionally remove CMI, (2) having reasonable
grounds to know that the removal will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal
copyright infringement? Addressing the second question first, we have
posited that actual or constructive knowledge of facilitation (etc.) may be
inferred when the person or entity removing CMI 82 invites or expects
downstream recommunication of the work. Since social media platforms
exist to make posted content available to other participants in the social
network, it is reasonable to conclude that the platforms, and those who post
to them, invite or expect downstream recommunication. Nonetheless, the
inference of knowledge of facilitation of infringement may require more
than knowledge of downstream redistribution of copies with altered or
removed CMI. It may also be necessary to establish a nexus between the
absence of CMI and consequent facilitation of infringement, for example,
that upstream recipients are more likely to engage in unauthorized
recommunications of the work if the copies they access lack CMI. 83
The next question would be whether the platform’s CMI-removal
is “intentional.” Much metadata-stripping may in fact be unintentional. As
the district court in Stevens v. CoreLogic, observed:
There are many points throughout the file handling process when
metadata can be altered or completely deleted unintentionally from
a photograph. Images uploaded to CoreLogic’s MLS platforms

From Photos: IPTC Releases Results of 2016 Social Media Sites Photo Metadata Test,
https://iptc.org/news/many-social-media-sites-still-remove-image-rights-information-fromphotos (last visited June 26, 2016).
82
If the platform merely conceals the metadata, so that users may, with some effort,
retrieve it, that act arguably is not the same as removing the data, and therefore no section 1202
claim would lie.
83
See Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86843 at 15-16 (S.D. Cal. July
1, 2016)(stating:
“There is absolutely no evidence that, had the CMI metadata been embedded in the
photographs, this might have prevented infringement, and that CoreLogic knew it
would help prevent infringement. Plaintiffs provide no evidence that the absence of
metadata led to actual copyright infringement, nor have the named Plaintiffs ever
used metadata to track down copyright infringers. Although Plaintiffs need not
show actual infringement, the fact that there was none is relevant to Plaintiffs’
burden to show that CoreLogic had a reasonable ground to believe it was likely to
happen.”).
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may be manipulated before or after uploading. Manipulations may
include resizing, rotating, cropping and adjusting resolution of the
image so it can be used in a preconfigured display layout on the
web page. All of these manipulations could result in inadvertent
removal of the embedded metadata. Embedded metadata can also
be removed inadvertently by email programs, opening an image on
an iPhone using iOS Safari, or pasting the image in some versions
of MS Word. 84
On the other hand, if the platform processes the uploads through a
program that the platform knows will excise CMI-bearing metadata, it
should not matter that the removal is automated and indiscriminate; setting
the default to eliminate embedded metadata, assuming this is a desired
result and not merely an unanticipated by-product of some other function,
represents a choice by the platform. Overbreadth of information-removal is
not an unanticipated by-product. Suppose the platform chooses to remove
metadata in order to reduce file size, and thus speed up the communication
of the content. The metadata may include not only authorship and
copyright information, but also non-CMI categories of information such as:
camera, GPS location, exposure time, ISO, aperture value, brightness value,
shutter speed value, light source, scene capture type, flash, and white
balance. 85 Or, in order to protect user privacy, the platform removes
metadata regarding location information, such as the GPS coordinates of a
house, school, or place of work depicted in the photo. 86 The presence of
lawfully removable non-CMI data such as the elements posited above
should not entitle the platform or website to bootstrap the author-identifying
information. 87 Intent need not be manifested as to individual works; it can
also be exercised through systems design. 88

84

Id. at 4.
These are all included in EXIF data. Milian, supra note 79. Other EXIF data,
however, such as the date of creation, may be CMI-relevant.
86
Users of smartphones commonly have no knowledge or understanding of the
embedded information in a photo they take and then post to social media. Twitter’s Safety lead
Del Harvey, for example, stated in an interview that she had made the decision to remove
location metadata from uploaded images in order to protect users from dangers they did not
know about. See Kashmir Hill, Meet Del Harvey, Twitter’s Troll Patrol, FORBES (July 2, 2014,
9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/02/meet-del-harvey-twitters-trollpatrol.
87
See, e.g., STOYAN STEFANOV & NICOLE SULLIVAN, EVEN FASTER WEBSITES 144
(2009) (cautioning: “Warning: Strip meta information only from images you own. By stripping
metadata from someone else’s JPEG, you might also strip any copyright or authorship data,
which is illegal.”). The post distinguishes programs that “. . . take an all-or-nothing approach to
handling metadata” and points users to a program offering “. . . more fine-grained metadata
editing . . .” Id. Platforms can in fact design their systems to remove lawfully removable non85
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Where the platform does not remove the data from copies residing
on its website, but it makes available to its users download programs that
strip the data from the downloaded content, one may initially ask whether
the person or entity removing the data is the platform or the user. Does the
user “make” the copy and remove the data in the process, or does the
platform, as part of its distribution of the copy remove the data? 89 The user
may not know, much less intend, that her downloaded copy has been
deprived of CMI. The platform, however, through its systems design
choices, has effectively imposed CMI-removal, and might be directly or
contributorily liable for § 1202 violations. 90
But would the platform nonetheless avoid § 1202 liability on the
ground that, as a host service provider, it enjoys immunity under § 512(c) of
the copyright act? At first blush, § 512(c) would not apply, because a §
1202 violation is not quite the same thing as an “infringement of copyright”
from which § 512 relieves service providers of liability. 91 § 501 defines “an
infringer of copyright” as “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the
author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or
phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602.” 92 Section

CMI data but keep the author-identifying information. Email from Andreas Gebhard, Director
of Content Development, Getty Images, Inc. to Lisa Willmer, Vice President, Corporate
Counsel, Getty Images, Inc., (May 25, 2016) (on file with author).
88
Even if the platform systematically strips CMI, plaintiff cannot prevail in a section
1202 action unless it can show that the works, when sent to the platform, in fact had embedded
CMI. See Stevens v. CoreLogic, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86843 at 12-13 (plaintiffs could not
prove that, at the time of upload, photographs had CMI).
89
Compare, Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)
(denominating the users of a “remote VCR” service offering on-demand storage and access to
cable transmissions of copyrighted television programming as the “makers” of copies
downloaded to users’ individual digital “storage lockers” on defendant cable transmitter’s
servers), with London Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (act of
distribution committed by operator of P2P source computer that causes a copy to be made in
the computer of the user requesting a download from the source computer).
90
While liability for contributory infringement generally requires specific knowledge as
to which works are infringed–general knowledge that third-party use of the accused device will
infringe some copyrights therefore does not suffice. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). “All-or-nothing” metadata-stripping programs will
systematically remove CMI from all downloaded images, thus arguably satisfying the
knowledge element.
91
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright”).
92
Id. § 501(a).
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1203 sets out civil remedies for “a violation of section 1201 or 1202”; while
we have seen that § 1202 violations are linked to copyright infringement, in
that the knowing removal or alteration of CMI must also be done with
actual or constructive knowledge that it will facilitate infringement, the
prohibited conduct is not itself infringing, nor does it require that
infringement in fact have occurred. 93 Under this reading, then, a host
service provider finds no shelter under § 512 for direct or contributory
violation of § 1202.
Nonetheless, stretching § 512 to cover infringement-related
conduct addressed in § 1202, the next question, for the sake of argument,
would be whether the platform meets the threshold requirements set out in §
512(i) to qualify for the immunity. The provision makes “accommodation
of technology” a “condition of eligibility” and states that “the service
provider must accommodate and not interfere with ‘standard technical
measures.’” 94 It defines “standard technical measures” as technical
measures that: (1) are "used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works"; (2) "have been developed pursuant to a broad
consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair,
voluntary, multi-industry standards process"; (3) "are available to any
person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms"; and (4) "do not impose
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their
systems or networks." 95
If metadata such as IPTC information fits the statutory criteria,
then platforms that remove it are not accommodating “standard technical
measures” but are instead “interfering with” them, and therefore would be
disqualified from claiming safe harbor protection under § 512(c). As for
whether metadata regarding copyright information does constitute a
“standard technical measure,” the Southern District of California in
Gardner v. Cafepress Inc., 96 ruled that summary judgment could not be
granted to the defendant with respect to the second element (plaintiff’s
93
As further indication that a § 1202 violation is not “infringement of copyright,” while
§ 411(a) requires that United States works be registered prior to initiating an action for
infringement of copyright, courts have held that § 411(a) does not apply to actions alleging
violations of CMI under § 1202. See, e.g., Med. Broad. Co. v. Flaiz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22185 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003) (“Nothing in § 1202 of the DMCA suggests that registration is
a precondition to a lawsuit. While a copyright registration is a prerequisite under 17 U.S.C. §
411 (a) for an action for copyright infringement, claims under the DMCA, however, are simply
not copyright infringement claims and are separate and distinct from the latter.”)
94
Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
95
Id. § 512(i)(2).
96
Gardner v. CafePress Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25405, *15-16 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
2014), aff’d, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173726 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014).
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metadata appeared consistent with the other statutory elements, and
defendant did not seek summary judgment on that ground):
at a minimum, Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to create a
dispute of material fact as to whether CafePress's deletion of
metadata when a photo is uploaded constitutes the failure to
accommodate and/or interference with "standard technical
measures." From a logical perspective, metadata appears to be an
easy and economical way to attach copyright information to an
image. Thus, a sub-issue is whether this use of metadata has been
"developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and
service providers." Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude, as a
matter of law, that CafePress has satisfied the prerequisites of
§ 512(i). 97
To date, there appears to be no further judicial assessment of
whether author-identifying metadata constitutes a standard technical
measure. But the statutory language does not encourage sanguine
expectations. Because the participation of service providers in the
development of the standard could disqualify them from immunity were the
service providers to fail to accommodate the technical measure, service
providers have every incentive to abstain from participation. Their
abstention defeats the development of a standard that meets statutory
requirements, and therefore leaves non-accommodating service providers’
statutory shelter undisturbed.
If CMI metadata is not yet a standard technical measure, then the
metadata-removing platforms may qualify to invoke the safe harbor of §
512(c), but they next must demonstrate that their activities are consonant
with those the statute immunizes. The principal issue would be whether
metadata-stripping comes within the scope of “infringement of copyright by
reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” 98
Data-stripping is not “storage”; it alters—at the instance of the host—the
file the user directed to be stored on the host’s server. Courts have
interpreted “by reason of the storage” to encompass a broad range of
activities additional to mere storage, for example reasoning that the
immunity must also cover the communication of the stored material at the
request of other users, otherwise the safe harbor would be ineffective. 99
97
The court gave no shrift to defendant’s reliance on the automatic nature of its
removal of the metadata during the uploading process. See id. at *15-16.
98
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
99
See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012).
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More broadly still, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that “a service provider
may be exempt from infringement liability for activities that it otherwise
could not have undertaken ‘but for’ the storage of the infringing material at
the direction of one of its users.” 100 Had the users not uploaded the files to
the platform, the service provider could not have removed their metadata.
But such a “but for” construction risks bootstrapping a good deal of conduct
well in excess of the storage and communication of the user-posted content.
As the Gardner court observed, “This interpretation does not, however, give
a service provider free rein to undertake directly infringing activities merely
because it allows users to upload content at will.” 101 By the same token,
removal of CMI metadata, albeit automated, and perhaps undertaken to
enhance the communication speed of the user-posted files or to protect user
privacy, nonetheless is an activity the host engages in at its own initiative,
that is independent of the user’s “direction” to store and make available the
posted content, and that initiative may in turn violate § 1202.
Thus, if author-identifying and other copyright-relevant metadata
constitutes statutorily protected CMI, and the platforms intentionally
remove or alter it, having reasonable grounds to know that these acts will
facilitate infringement by downstream users, then the platforms may be
liable under § 1202, and they will not enjoy immunity under § 512(c), either
because that provision does not apply to violations that are not
“infringement of copyright”, or because metadata-stripping exceeds the
immunity accorded for storage and recommunication of user-posted
content.
IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ATTRIBUTION RIGHTS IN THE US
Let’s consider the prospects for U.S. attribution rights from two
perspectives: first, the extent to which current U.S. copyright law can
accommodate attribution interests; second, were Congress to act, what
should the legislation provide?
A. Attribution rights without legislation
First, one simple way to bring the U.S. into compliance with
international norms under the Berne article 10 quotation right would be for
courts to include authorship attribution as a consideration under the first fair
use factor: nature and purpose of the use. The “nature of the use” would
100
Gardner, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25405, at *18 (quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1018 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013).
101
Id.
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take into account whether the defendant credited the source and the author.
Authorship attribution has occasionally figured in court’s analyses; 102
however, to contend that it has weighed significantly in the balance would
overstate. But nothing in the statute or prior caselaw precludes the
development of a more vigorous attribution consideration as part of the
evaluation of the first factor. That technique would conform to the
Charming Betsy doctrine – the general principle that domestic statutes
should be interpreted in light of the U.S.’s international obligations. 103

102
The leading case is Weissmann v. Freeman, in which the defendant’s failure to credit
his erstwhile co-author contributed to the court’s holding the use unfair. 868 F.2d 1313, 1324
(2d Cir. 1989) (“In this case, it cannot be ignored that Dr. Freeman not only neglected to credit
appellant for her authorship of [the work in question], but actually attempted to pass off the
work as his own, substituting his name as author in place of hers.”). See also, Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1983). When defendants did credit the source of the
copied material, some courts have found authorship attribution a point in favor of fair use. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 2001 WL 1262964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001);
Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 918 (D. Mass. 1993); Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1256 (2d Cir. 1986).
103.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as
not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.”);
see also Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating
that statutes should be interpreted consistently with customary international law); see generally
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990). For an in-depth exploration of the role of the
Charming Betsy canon in US implementation of Berne minimum moral rights, see Graeme
Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights after Dastar, 61
NYU ANN. SUR. AM. LAW 111, 144-50 (2005).
The Charming Betsy doctrine is not inconsistent with sections 2 and 3 of the 1988 Berne
Convention Implementation Act, which provide:
Section 2
The Congress makes the following declarations:
(1) The Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed
at Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886, and all acts, protocols, and revisions
thereto (hereafter in this Act referred to as the “Berne Convention”) are not selfexecuting under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(2) The obligations of the United States under the Berne Convention may be
performed only pursuant to appropriate domestic law.
(3) The amendments made by this Act, together with the law as it exists on
the date of the enactment of this Act, satisfy the obligations of the United States in
adhering to the Berne Convention and no further rights or interests shall be
recognized or created for that purpose.
Section 3
Construction of the Berne Convention.
(a) Relationship with Domestic Law.
—The provisions of the Berne Convention—
(1) shall be given effect under title 17, as amended by this Act, and any other
relevant provision of Federal or State law, including the common law; and
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Second, the Copyright Office could improve the effectiveness of §
1202 as a source of authorship attribution rights. That provision empowers
the Copyright Office to identify additional elements of CMI; the Office
could clarify that information about the author includes creators of works
made for hire. More importantly, the Office could sponsor the development
of best practices for identifying and crediting authors, including adapting
author-identification for different types of works and different kinds of
media of communication. Many common law countries include a
reasonableness condition as part of the author-identification condition on
fair dealing 104 as well as in their affirmative protections of attribution
rights. 105 Multiple stakeholder consultations convened by the Copyright
Office could assist in developing best practices for reasonableness.
Australia may serve as an example. Its authorship-attribution obligation
lists reasonableness factors; these take account of industry practice and give
courts considerable discretion in their assessment of reasonableness. 106

(2) shall not be enforceable in any action brought pursuant to the provisions
of the Berne Convention itself.
(b) Certain Rights Not Affected.
—The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United
States thereto, and satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not
expand or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed under Federal,
State, or the common law—
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author’s honor
or reputation.
Berne Convention Implementation Act, § 2, 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
Section 2 is compatible with Charming Betsy because it confines the applicable law to U.S.
law, which Congress declares in conformity with the Berne Convention; U.S. courts therefore
should interpret U.S. law to ensure the accuracy of that declaration. Id. Section 3 directs courts
not to rely on the Berne Convention to expand rights to claim authorship, but given the
declaration that the U.S. already conforms to Berne attribution norms, an interpretation of U.S.
law that is consistent with Berne would not expand U.S. attribution rights. Id. at 3.
104
See generally supra note 30.
105
See, e.g., Australian Moral Rights Act, supra note 13 (amending Copyright Act 1968);
Canada Copyright Act, supra note 30, at ss 14.1(1) (“The author of a work has, . . . in
connection with an act mentioned in section 3, the right, where reasonable in the
circumstances, to be associated with the work as its author by name or under a pseudonym and
the right to remain anonymous.”).
106
See Australian Moral Rights Act, supra note 13, at s § 195AR(2)(a)–(i). This section
includes:
“(e) any practice, in the industry in which the work is used, that is relevant to
the work or the use of the work;
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Another area for Copyright Office intervention would concern
waivers of authorship-attribution. VARA includes elaborate provisions on
waivers, 107 to which we’ll return in the discussion of possible legislative
action. At the time of VARA’s enactment, Congress anticipated that the
statute’s requirement of specific waivers might in the long run simply
enhance lawyers’ and word processors’ employment opportunities, for
lawyers could be expected to devise language sufficiently comprehensive
and detailed to fend off every conceivable exercise of moral rights. This
would defeat the purpose of compelling artists and art owners to reflect on
and negotiate over the genuine need to forego moral rights. As a result,
Congress set an additional safeguard by instructing the United States
Copyright Office to conduct a study of the practice developed under the
law’s waiver clause. 108 The study, published in 1996, however, uncovered
too little data regarding actual waiver practice to permit meaningful
assessment of the frequency, content, and impact of waivers of attribution
and integrity rights under VARA. 109
The Copyright Office might renew this study, in order to ascertain
how VARA waiver practices have evolved, and might use those findings to
launch a broader study into the waiver of attribution in sectors beyond
works of visual art. The legal basis for the study would derive from §
1202(c)(8)’s empowerment of the Copyright Office to prescribe other
elements of copyright management information. If, as § 1202(c)(2)
provides, “the name of, and other identifying information about, the author
of the work,” is comprised within CMI, then, arguably, circumstances under
which authors relinquish the inclusion of their names as part of the CMI that
accompanies the work, comes within a broad ambit of Copyright Office
interpretation and implementation of § 1202.
B. Legislating attribution rights

(f) any practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in
which the work is used, that is relevant to the work or the use of that work;”
107
17 U.S.C. §106A(e)(1).
108
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, pt. 3, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6932-33.
109
See U.S. Copyright Office, Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks: Executive
Summary (Mar. 24, 1996), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html [hereinafter Waiver
of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks].
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Were Congress at last to implement at least the attribution
provision of Berne article 6bis, what should a statutory attribution right look
like? Any statute needs to confront the following issues: who is vested with
attribution rights, what violates the rights, and under what circumstances
may the rights be waived?
1.

Beneficiaries.

The right’s beneficiaries should be the human (not juridical)
authors and performers, regardless of their employment status. Unlike
VARA, an attribution rights amendment should not exclude from its ambit
creators of works made for hire. Nor should the law disqualify categories of
works: all works of authorship, and all musical, dramatic, choreographic or
audiovisual performances should be covered. Similarly, the number of a
work’s authors or performers should not of itself disqualify these
participants from the right to claim authorship. 110 Although a multiplicity of
authors or performers might prompt fears that enforcement of an attribution
right will be too unwieldy, the implementation problems are better
addressed through an infringement standard that incorporates a
reasonableness criterion, as well as through carefully devised waiver
provisions.
2.

Scope of the Attribution Right.

Consistently with Berne article 6bis, the duration of the attribution
right would be the same as the term of economic rights. 111 The attribution
110
Caselaw on joint authorship may afford guidance as to what kinds of contributions
make someone an “author.” See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir.
2000) (stating that who is an “author” is a fact-specific inquiry and that “[p]rogress would be
retarded rather than promoted, if an author could not consult with others and adopt their useful
suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership of the work”); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d
500, 507–08 (2d Cir. 1991) (creating a two-part test for determining coauthorship that requires
(1) “all joint authors to make copyrightable contributions” and (2) that “the putative joint
authors regarded themselves as joint authors”); see also Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 205
(2d Cir. 1998) (applying the Childress test to find lack of coauthorship in the play Rent).
Several law reviews also address the concept of “authorship.” See generally F. Jay Dougherty,
Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law,
49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative
Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2003); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”:
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
111
Berne, supra note 6, at art. 6bis(2). The minimum Berne term for most works is 50
years post mortem auctoris. Id. art. 7. If the term of protection in the country of origin is
shorter than in the country for which protection is sought (e.g., 50 pma in the former and 70
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right would be infringed when an author’s or performer’s name is omitted
from publicly distributed copies and phonorecords or from public
performances, including transmissions, of the work. 112 Though the statute
should distinguish between public and private distributions or
communications, with only the public ones triggering the right, fair use and
other statutory exceptions should generally be conditioned on providing
authorship credit, where reasonable. The test of reasonableness in this
context is whether the use, even if free, should acknowledge the user’s

pma in the latter), Berne art. 7(8) allows the country of protection to apply the shorter term of
the country of origin, and therefore to protect neither moral nor economic rights during the last
20 years of the term in the country of protection. Id. art. 7(8). It is not clear if the country of
protection could accord economic but not moral rights during the last 20 years.
Arguably, the public interest in accurate identification of a work’s creators persists
beyond the expiration of exclusive economic rights in the work. I doubt that a healthy public
domain demands freedom not only to copy, but also to deny or to falsify authorship credit.
Nonetheless, different durational consequences flow from the distinct nature of authors’ rights
on the one hand, and consumer protection on the other. The interests underlying these regimes
may at times converge, hence authors’ pre-Dastar resort to the Lanham Act, faute de mieux.
But neither fully captures the other. By placing the attribution right in the U.S. Copyright Act, I
am contending that it is an exclusive right like the other rights comprising a copyright—
enforceable (for limited times) without proof of economic harm or consumer confusion. The
unfair competition-based Lanham Act claim does not confer a property right in gross; it allows
injured economic actors (who may not in fact be authors) to act as proxies for the confused
consumer, to correct the false information the defendant has injected into the marketplace. To
each regime its own: to authors, control over the use of their names in connection with their
works for so long as economic rights last, and to consumers, protection against false
representations of fact in commercial advertising or promotion for so long as those
misrepresentatio are materially misleading.
112
Works incorporating substantial preexisting copyrighted material, such as derivative
works, should also credit the authors of the adapted or substantially excerpted work. The
obligation to give credit would be subject to a reasonableness standard.
An amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to establish attribution rights would also
require a transitional provision concerning the right’s effective date. I would propose that a
work first publicly communicated or distributed on or after the amendment’s effective date be
covered by the attribution right, regardless of when the work was created. With respect to
public communications or distributions occurring before the amendment’s effective date, the
amendment should preserve such state or federal attribution rights as may then have existed.
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2) (preserving state attribution and integrity claims in works created or
sold prior to VARA’s effective date); see also Australian Moral Rights Act, supra note 13, at ss
195AZM(1)-(2) (Austl.) (amending Copyright Act 1968, providing that the 2000 Moral Rights
amendments are prospective only). In relation to literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works,
other than those included in a film, the right of attribution applies to works that were made
before or after December 21, 2000. Id. at s 195AZM(2). However, the right applies only to acts
carried out after December 21, 2000. See id. In relation to films and literary, dramatic, or
musical works and works included in films, the right of attribution only applies to films made
after December 21, 2000. See id. s 195AZM(1).
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sources. The manner and media of both the source work’s and the quoting
work’s disseminations may well affect the reasonableness of the user’s non
inclusion of authors’ or performers’ names. For example, if the author’s
name is not disclosed on or in connection with the source work, it may not
be reasonable to require the user to undertake an extensive search to identify
the author (and Berne art, 10(3) does not require it). Or, a requirement that
the user identify all authors and performers may unreasonably encumber the
radio broadcast of a song, but webcasts of the song might more
conveniently include the listing in on-screen credits.
As for the details of a reasonableness standard, as suggested earlier
regarding Copyright Office regulations, a U.S. statute might profitably
emulate the Australian Act, both in its technique, placing on the exploiter
the burden of showing reasonableness, and in its articulation of
reasonableness factors, including its encouragement to parties to devise
voluntary codes for various sectors of creative activities. In fact, the credit
agreements negotiated between industry groups such as the several motion
picture and television guilds and the studios 113 might inspire similar codes
elsewhere.
In light of the uncertain status of creators’ Lanham Act false
attribution claims post-Dastar, the attribution rights amendment to the U.S.
Copyright Act should also prohibit false attributions of authorship. These
claims are analytically distinct from traditional moral rights, which protect
the author’s right to claim authorship of her works: these instead assert a
right to disclaim authorship of a work not by the author. Nonetheless, if the
Lanham Act cannot redress these claims, then the Copyright Act should
provide a remedy. The proposed amendment would in this respect follow
the various common law jurisdictions discussed earlier, whose moral rights
amendments grant authors rights against both non-attribution and false
attribution. 114
3.

Waiver

Both VARA and, to some extent, the Australian amendments,
provide an appropriately narrow approach to waivers of attribution rights.
To be enforceable, the waiver should be in writing and signed by the author
113
See, e.g., WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA—EAST, Minimum Basic Agreement: An
Overview, https://www.wgaeast.org/for-members/guild-contracts/minimum-basic-agreementan-overview/ (last visited June 27, 2016).
114
See, e.g., UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, supra note 13, at c. 48, §§84(5)–
(6); Australian Moral Rights Act, supra note 13, at ss 195AD–195AH (amending Copyright Act
1968).
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or performer before the work is created or performed,
and should
specifically identify the works and the kinds of uses to which the waiver
applies. As in Australia, the waiver might, unless otherwise specified, pass
on to the co-contractant’s successors. On the other hand, ambiguities in the
scope of the waiver should be construed against the party asserting the
waiver (whether or not that party is the original grantee). Unlike the
Australian Act, a U.S. attribution rights statute should not allow blanket
waivers for present and future works of employees. Employee-executed
waivers should meet the same standard as those of authors who are vested
with copyright. Because attribution rights are independent of economic
rights, 116 an author should not need to be vested with the economic rights in
order to qualify as a holder of attribution rights. With respect to works of
multiple authorship, my proposal departs from VARA, which allows one
joint author to waive all co-authors’ rights. 117 I would provide that a waiver
is effective only as to the co-author(s) who sign the requisitely specific
writing; co-authors who do not sign would retain their attribution rights. 118

115
Formalization of the waiver before creation or performance may be necessary to
avoid extortion by transferees who demand the waiver in return for payment for work done.
See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco, Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1992)
(requiring that writing that makes a commissioned work “for hire” be executed before creation
of the work).
116
See, e.g., Berne, supra note 6, at art. 6bis; 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)–(b) (stating that
authors of works of visual art have attribution and integrity rights “whether or not the author is
the copyright owner”).
117
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
118
The U.S. Copyright Office Study, noted above, makes a similar recommendation.
Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, supra note 108. A point of relative consensus
voiced in the Office’s public proceedings and in academic sources such as Nimmer on
Copyright was that VARA inappropriately permits one joint author to waive the moral rights of
coauthors in a joint work . . . . Congress may wish to amend the statute to provide that no joint
author may waive another’s statutory moral rights without the written consent of each joint
author whose rights would be affected. Id; see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 8D-84-85 (2003); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares
Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 45 n.246 (1997) (“[A]llowing one joint author
to waive the rights under VARA for all other joint authors significantly undermines the
rationale for moral rights protection.”).
By contrast, a recent, well-developed proposal for an attribution rights statute partly
inspired by sections 106A and 1202, has been proposed. See Jennifer Chandler, The Right to
Attribution: Benefitting Authors and Sharing Accurate Content in the Public Domain, 22 J.L.
INF. & SCI. 75, 88–90 (2012). Chandler proposes to avoid the waiver issue altogether, by
conditioning the attribution right’s existence on its assertion in “attribution management
information.” Notwithstanding the elegance of this approach, it is incompatible with the Berne
Convention, which prohibits subjecting the existence or enforcement of national and Berne
minimum rights (including moral rights) to any formality. An obligation to assert attribution
information is a forbidden condition. See, e.g., Shelia J. McCartney, Moral Rights Under the
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Remedies.

Injunctive and monetary relief should be available to redress
violations of the attribution right. Although a remedy compelling inclusion
of the author’s name in subsequent public distributions or communications
of the work may be the principal form of relief, modification of existing,
undistributed inventory may also be appropriate. 119 Authors should be able
to claim damages based on a showing of specific harm. Alternatively,
because such a showing may be difficult to demonstrate, 120 an attribution
rights amendment ought to provide for statutory damages. As is already the
case for VARA violations, registration should not be a prerequisite to
obtaining statutory damages, and the range of statutory damages remitted to
judicial discretion should be the same as for violations of economic
rights. 121 The amount of statutory damages (or, for that matter, actual
damages) may depend on the effectiveness of injunctive relief. Finally, the
application of the statutory remission of damages for certain non profit
entities’ good faith, but unsuccessful, invocation of fair use, 122 warrants
consideration in light of my recommendation that courts take authorship

United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, 15 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 205
(1991) (criticizing moral rights assertion obligation in UK CDPA).
Finally, there may be instances in which the public would retain an interest in
knowing who is a work’s true author even if that person willingly (and specifically) waived her
attribution right. This is another reason to maintain the distinction between copyright-based
and Lanham Act-based (mis)attribution claims.
119
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (discussing the addition of notice to copies distributed to the
public after omission of notice is discovered); see also, e.g., Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle
Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing the application of § 405(a)(2)’s notice
requirement).
120
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998). Architect Johnson sued
another architect, Jones, who had copied Johnson’s plans but put his own name on them. Id. at
499. The court of appeals held that Johnson was entitled to recover Jones’s gross revenue from
the reverse passing off, and that Johnson’s “actual damage claims were ‘wholly speculative,’”
and thus not recoverable. Id. at 507; see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that evidence supported a damage award claim of $200,000 for voice
misappropriation under California law for the “shock, anger, and embarrassment” of a
performer whose voice was imitated in a radio commercial jingle). See Martin v. City of
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (damage awards under VARA). In Martin, the City
of Indianapolis intentionally destroyed a work of art by Martin, who sued under VARA. Id. at
610–11. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s award of $20,000 in statutory damages,
then the maximum amount allowed for a non-willful VARA violation. See id. at 610, 614.
121
See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (referencing § 106A(a)).
122
Id. § 504(c)(2) (“The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the
copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107. . .”).
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attribution into account in evaluating the first fair use factor.
If the
defendant did not name the author of a copied work on which the author’s
name appeared, and the court rejected the fair use defense, one might
contend that the omission of the author’s name is not consonant with good
faith, and accordingly disqualifies remission of statutory damages.
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to secure for limited
times the exclusive right of authors to their writings. Curiously, those rights,
as enacted in our copyright laws, have not included a general right to be
recognized as the author of one's writings. Yet, the interest in being
identified with one's work is fundamental, whatever the conception of the
philosophical or policy bases for copyright. The basic fairness of giving
credit where it is due advances both the author-regarding and the publicregarding aspects of copyright.
Most national copyright laws guarantee the right of attribution (or
“paternity”); the leading international copyright treaty, the Berne
Convention, requires that Member States protect other Members' authors'
right to claim authorship. But, apart from an infinitesimal (and badly
drafted) recognition of the right in the 1990 Visual Artist’s Right Act, and
an uncertain and indirect route through protection of copyright management
information, the U.S. has not implemented that obligation. Perpetuating
that omission not only allows a source of international embarrassment to
continue to fester; it also belittles our own creators. Copyright not only
protects the economic interests in a work of authorship, it also secures (or
should secure) the dignitary interests that for many authors precede
monetary gain. Without established and enforceable attribution rights, U.S.
copyright neither meets international norms nor fulfills the aspirations of
the constitutional Copyright Clause.

SESSION 3: KEYNOTE ADDRESS Q&A
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Supra, text accompanying notes 102-103.
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MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: I want to start off with just a quick
question about the Dastar case because I think that's something that people
have listed as the linchpin of U.S. compliance, in some sense. What would
your view be of whether the Dastar case actually is a linchpin? So at the
time that we actually, you know, complied with the Berne Convention or
said that we complied with the Berne Convention, Dastar had not actually
come down. Would you agree that at that time, our moral rights protections
were stronger—would you believe that they were actually still somewhat
weak?
PROF. GINSBURG: I think that when we ratified the Berne
Convention, it was possible to make a barely plausible argument that our
patchwork, which importantly included Lanham Act § 43(a), sufficed.
Moreover, I acknowledge that Jack Kernochan and I wrote an article taking
the position that the patchwork could be sufficient. I will also point out that
we wrote that before the UK and other common law countries added
explicit moral rights. At the time, it was argued that the United States did
not need to have explicit moral rights in the copyright law, so long as
effective protection resulted, whatever the source of the rights. The UK
served as an example in support of this proposition; at the time there were
no explicit moral rights in UK copyright law, yet the UK was a
longstanding member of the Berne Convention. Accordingly, if the UK
could be a member, so could the US.
That largely unspoken argument then became somewhat less
persuasive when common law countries did start enacting explicit moral
rights provisions. So that's another element that perhaps has changed the
way one evaluates the question between 1988 and 1989 and post- Dastar.
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: And then just to follow up on the postDastar point, you had mentioned that some district courts are taking a
broader reading of the Dastar decision. You know, there is a debate among
academics as to whether you should construe it broadly or narrowly. Can
you kind of give a little bit more detail as to how lower courts are
interpreting Dastar and whether that affects how we might use the Lanham
Act for compliance with moral rights.
PROF. GINSBURG: The first line of defense against a post-Dastar
collapse of attribution claims (a defense which crumbled quickly) was—and
Peter Yu alluded to it—that Dastar concerned a work in the public domain.
You may recall Justice Scalia's colorful language about a “mutant copyright
law,” that the plaintiffs there were end running their failure to renew the
copyright in the motion picture. As a result, they should not be allowed to
get themselves a kind of de facto extended copyright by bringing the
Lanham Act into service.
Thus, the narrowest reading of Dastar would be that regardless of
what the court said, on its facts, this was a case about a work in the public
domain; the court’s decision did not prejudge or determine the assessment
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of a false attribution or maybe even a non-attribution claim with respect to a
work that is still under copyright. That reading did not prevail,
understandably so in light of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Lanham Act meaning of “origin” of goods or services. According to the
Court, a “false designation of origin” does not mean the intellectual origin
of the work. For the Court, “origin” means the physical origin, the producer,
distributor of the physical goods. As a result, it matters neither whether the
author is alleging a false designation of origin or a non-designation of
origin. If “origin” excludes intellectual origin, then that provision of the
Lanham Act cannot serve as a source of attribution rights.
Worse, some lower courts have attributed rather broad preemptive
effect to Dastar to conclude that attribution rights or false attribution claims
cannot be advanced under other theories of law either. This very broad
interpretation of Dastar means that the Lanham Act no longer is a source of
attribution rights, nor are other common law theories. As a result, the
patchwork of federal and state claims that was evoked in 1988/1989 as
cumulatively providing sufficient coverage of moral rights is looking less
like a quilt and more like two or three very ragged strips.
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: And with that, I want to turn it over to
the audience to see if we have any specific questions to Professor Ginsburg
about how we might strengthen moral rights of attribution or whether we
need to. Yes?
MR. LEVY: What I didn't hear in your talk about legislation was
why we should have legislation implementing a right of attribution. Is it
strictly because we agreed to in the Berne Convention, or are there other
reasons affecting the public interests why the general public would be
benefited by adopting this?
PROF. GINSBURG: First, in assuming an international obligation
Congress, we can infer, did take the public interest into account. By
ratifying the Berne Convention and passing implementing legislation,
Congress determined that membership in the Berne Union was a good thing
for the United States. Because the Berne Convention does not allow
reservations, the public policy of the United States would have embraced all
treaty obligations, not just those obligations minus Article 6bis (moral
rights),
Ratifying the Berne Convention was a good thing not just for
authors but for the public and also for the American economy as a whole.
Because even back in the 1980s, our economy relied decreasingly on the
production of goods such as cars, and steel, and electronics. But the U.S.
certainly was creating and exporting a great deal of intellectual content.
Thus we had a national interest beyond the perhaps parochial interests of
authors in having very good international protection.
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Second, attribution rights are in the public interest in part for what
some might consider to be consumer protection interest, that the public has
an interest in knowing who created this work. The author’s interest,
moreover, is not simply a vanity interest; her ability to make a living largely
turns on reputation, but without name recognition, she has no reputation to
exploit.
I think that the Constitution conceives of copyright as creating an
environment that will encourage creativity; being recognized for one’s
creations is very much part of that environment. As James Madison wrote
in Federalist No. 43, in explaining and supporting the constitution vesting
of power in Congress to enact laws concerning copyright and patent: “The
public good fully coincides in [the case of copyright] with the claims of
individuals.”
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: Any other questions? Yes?
MS. DEVORAH: Hi, Carrie Devorah, Center for Copyright
Integrity. I was very excited when you were speaking. I'm thinking oh,
awesome. How is it nobody has gone after Google for doing exactly the
violations you were talking about should not be done? I also wanted to raise
a point about David Slater, the monkey photographer. Gotten to know him.
I would consider what David did in what he explained to me as set design.
He worked for weeks with a monkey to encourage the monkey to become
familiar, so just to keep points on—a fact on point. But Google, look what
they've done. They have walked away with all of our works. I took a picture
of a picture I just did, sent it out to a colleague of mine, but that picture's
now been taken from me. I'm not dead yet. I'm not life-plus seventy so how
is it that Google has escaped the liability of what you just so wonderfully
described a liability existing for?
PROF. GINSBURG: I think that question may go to economic rights
as much as to attribution rights. On—
MS. DEVORAH: It removes names all the time.
PROF. GINSBURG: There have been a number of variations of the
Monkey Selfie story. Some versions have given the monkey more agency
than others under the maximal monkey agency approach.
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: Coined a new term.
PROF. GINSBURG: Up there with the Zika virus, right? In the
variations of the story where the photographer set the scene and all the
monkey did was click the shutter, there may be sufficient human authorship
to justify a copyright. There are in fact cases not only in the U.S. but in
other countries, where the dispute concerns exactly that scenario. The
photographer has set the scene, and somebody comes along and pushes the
button. In those cases, courts generally consider that it is the person who
structured the image, not the person who pushed the button, who is the
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author of the work. But this kind of dispute gets to the question fairly
raised. If we're going to have an attribution right, we had better know who's
an author. In many instances, that will not be too difficult to figure out.
Moreover, in lots of instances, there are, indeed, conventions about giving
credit. Consider the Writers' Guild agreements and such. That, at the
margins, it may be difficult to identify who is an author is not an adequate
reason to deny attribution rights altogether. On the contrary, I think we need
to work on coming up with reasonable and implementable notions of
authorship, especially because digital media, in fact, offer a lot of
opportunities for robust author-identifying information.
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: Any other questions? Yeah.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: I was going to circle back to this
in RMI, but I'm curious. When you were talking about the AFP v. Morel
case and the—in connection with the CMI information there, do you favor a
more broad interpretation or a more narrow one?
PROF. GINSBURG: I think that the claim could be made out in the
Morel case because what Agence France Presse did was to make the picture
available for other news entities to then reproduce and communicate it. The
plaintiff therefore could show that defendants had reasonable grounds to
know that there would be a downstream infringement.
But the facts don't always work out with the downstream
infringement. Were removal of the attribution itself an infringement, (which
is what the WIPO Copyright Act says) then downstream infringement
wouldn’t be an issue. The question then becomes: Can you fix that gap
between the international norm and our implementation of that norm? Is it
possible to fix the gap without legislation? I think it would be desirable to
come up with a creative way to close the gap without legislation because
I'm not so sanguine about legislation. But if we are going to have
legislation, revising § 1202 to prohibit the removal of authors’ names is a
clear candidate. In the interim, I invite people to be creative in thinking
about how to interpret § 1202 to make it consistent with our international
obligations
MR. KAUFMAN: Yes, I'm Josh Kaufman. Okay, I argued for AFP
in the Morel case, and my take is a little different on the case. First of all, it
was fascinating. The jury had no understanding at all about the DMCA. I
mean, that was very clear. At the early part of it, the judge—there was no
Morel name on any of the artworks. By way of background, he posted
these—initial it was thought that it was a citizen journalist. Somebody stole
them, a guy name Swarel [ph]. So AFP initially takes them off Swarel's site
and lists it and giving Swarel credit. A few hours later, they find out it was
Morel, and they always gave Morel credit. He was always in the tag; it says
AFP Morel or AFP Getty, Morel as part of the distribution.
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There was never any time that his name was removed because his
name wasn't on anything. It wasn't on the website. It wasn't on his website,
either. So there was never any removal. There was never any distribution by
AFP, or its subscribers, or Getty, without attribution to Morel.
What the jury seemed to have found, and they—again, it was
convoluted because—well, we don't have to get into that into the woods, but
what—it was that they associated. It said AFP, Getty, Morel, which is
standard media information for a source distributor and photographer. And
it was that—since he wasn't affiliated, it seemed that it was that
misassociation that was the basis of the very small DMCA award. But there
was never—which was kind of odd for us because there was never any
distribution. And the court also specifically did not—they ruled against the
argument that they originally made was—they originally said this was
going to be a $180 million case because of the DMCA going downstream
and the court ruled not, that the downstream users were not going to be
counted as part of the DMCA damages.
PROF. GINSBURG: I think that your account of the facts illustrates
why it would be a really good idea to develop standards or best practices
that the copyright office might endorse for defining what is copyright
management information.
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: I think we have time for one last
question if we have any—I guess my last question is do you have any
predictions? You said you weren't that sanguine about the possibility of
legislation.
PROF. GINSBURG: I think some of the possibilities are in your—
the Copyright Office’s—hands. So I want to be sanguine about what the
Copyright Office can do. I think there is in fact quite a lot that the
Copyright Office can do, both in terms of articulating enforceable norms
and certainly in terms of moral suasion. There are two takeaways from this
talk: one is that Article 10(3) of the Berne Convention’s condition on the
quotation right that the author be credited if her name appears on the source
publication imposes a norm enforceable through the WTO. Takeaway
number two, much of what we consider fair use would fit within the
quotation right, and therefore courts should start developing a reasonable
attribution condition as part of its consideration of the first fair use factor
under § 107(1). A corollary to this takeaway: the Copyright Office can
develop guidelines for what constitutes reasonable author attribution.
MS. TEMPLE CLAGGETT: Well, I want to take this time, once
again, to thank Professor Jane Ginsburg for her talk.

